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1. Introduction 
1.1. This paper was originally presented as Institute for Development 
Studies Discussion Paper Noj 105 in April 1971. The author 
acknowledge gratefully advice received and accepts responsibility 
for all remaining errors of fact and judgement. 
1.2 It is stated in the D970-74- Development Plan that the 
Government is anxious to see cotton production expanded 
considerably. This policy is attractive for several reasons. 
First, the demand for lint for processing within Kenya is 
increasing rapidly as more textile mills come into operation and 
increasing quantities can be sold on the world market without 
difficulty. Second, the demand for cotton seed for crushing by 
mills in Kenya is increasing, this demand being derived from a 
rising demand for vegetable oils and oil seed cakes. Third, 
cotton can be grown in many of the more marginal areas of the 
Republic where there are few alternative cash cropping opportunities. 
An expanded production of cotton could, therefore, be an 
important means of increasing the incomes of many of the more 
underprivileged farmers in Kenya. 
1.3. Despite this potential, cotton production has remained disappointi-
ng, current levels only slightly greater than they were in the 
late 1930s. The main reason for this is simply that with current 
standards of husbandry and prices farmers generally do not find 
it a rewarding crop to grow. For example, data in the 1969 
Annual Report of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board (CLSMB) 
reveal that the average gross return per acre of cotton to the 
farmer was only about Shs. 81/- in 1969, Implying a yield of 
around 160 lbs per acre of seed cotton, and Shs. 63/- in 1'968 . 
After deducting the costs of purchased inputs used which probably 
were very low, the average return to labour on this relatively 
labour intensive crop must be very discouraging. It is hardly 
surprising that in most cases farmers do not share the Government's 
enthusiasm for the crop. 
1.4. Clearly, then, the essential requisite for Increased cotton 
production in Kenya is for farmers to obtain significantly 
higher returns from cotton growing. This objective may be 
achieved by increasing average yields, raising the price of seed 
cotton to farmers or lowering the costs of inputs. Although 
there has been no marked technological advance in cotton production 
of the 'green revolution' type as there has been with maize for 
example, current average yields remain so far below -... 
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The potential yields which can be obtained from cotton varieties 
currently available that obviously the main constraint lies in 
poor standards of husbandry. The reasons for this state of affairs 
probably are a lack of knowledge and motivation on the part of 
farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture must be blamed for the poor 
standard of it's cotton extension service although this was inherited 
from the CLSM3 which formerly operated it. It seems that not only 
are the processes of disseminating information inefficient but the 
extension agents themselves often lack the correct information on 
cotton production. The author consider that the lack of motivation 
stems primarily from low prices to growers for seed cotton. Low 
producer prices tend to set off a self perpetuating cycle: lack 
of motivation leads to poor husbandry standards leads to low 
producer returns and so on. Therefore, it is seen that the 
essential prerequisite to achieving increased cotton production 
in the short run simply means better prices for seed cotton. In 
the longer run, of course, further improvements in yields through 
raising husbandry standards will depend on the information available 
to farmers. However, price increases can be implemented 
immediately and the main objective of this paper is to seek ways 
and means of achieving this. 
1.5. Even a preliminary examination of governmental policies in 
Kenya towards cotton in the past reveals so many glaring errors 
that it is considered instructive to list them even at this 
early stage. Some of these policies have been corrected partially or . 
completely already but even in these cases, their harmful effects 
on the industry are likely to be felt for some time to come. 
These policies are listed below. 
(i) Burdening an underdavelopagricultural industry with supporting 
its own development, extension and research expenses. Such over-
head costs are properly borne by central government although a 
relatively well developed agricultural industry such as (in Kenya) 
coffee or tea can make a substantial contribution towards them. 
Now largely corrected by central government taking over these 
expenses. 
(ii) Burdening an undeveloped agricultural industry with a high 
cost marketing board which in the past has provided few productive 
services. Partially corrected in that although the CLSMB still 
incurs high administration costs it does appear to be taking a 
more active role in processing and marketing the crop. 
(iii) Imposing on the industry a co-operative marketing structure 
which was incapable of operating efficiently and, in some cases, 
was against the will of the growers. The correct role of govern-
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ment is to promote and support the expression of growers to 
co-operate in marketing their products and not to impose a 
co-operative marketing structure on them. Partially corrected 
in that subsidies to certain co-op. unions have been curtailed 
and co-operative marketing is not being imposed in new areas 
unless there is a strong co-operative movement already in 
existence3 e.g. Mwea. 
(iv) Remunerating ginneries on a cost plus pricing formula which 
has resulted in excess profits being earned by ginners, production 
costs being excessively high ana with ginning capacity remaining 
unrationalised. Not yet corrected. 
(v) Effectively ignoring the fact that seed cotton produces the 
joint products of \int and cotton seed after ginning."*" The growers® 
price for seed cotton has been set according to lint prices alone 
while cotton seed returns have accrued to the CLSMB uncorrected. 
(vi) Issuing cotton seed for planting free of charge. This has led 
to considerable waste of seed. Partially corrected in that growers 
receive a price differential for seed cotton produced according 
to whether they received seed free or for a fgg• (still subsidised). 
This still means that the less efficient producer (i.e. producing 
less seed cotton per unit input of seed) is less induced to use 
seed efficiently than a more efficient one. 
(vii) The withholding of revenue from producers. Thus during 
the Korean war boom considerable reserves were built up which 
were subsequently lost in trying to support the costs of develop-
ment and research outlined in (i) above. If these funds had 
been passed onto producers, at least over a period of years (a) 
production would have been encouraged; (b) the absence of such 
large reserves would not have encouraged incorrect and wasteful 
financing policies. Uncorrected in that it seems to be a continuing 
policy of the CLSMB to build up large reserves during the past 
two years. 
(viii) The lack of eo-ordination between the production, processing 
and marketing agents and cotton researchers to ensure that on-
going research is effective. 
(ix) The outcome of the above 8 points is that in general cotton 
growers* returns have been substantially less than they could 
have been given lint and cotton seed prices. 
"'""In fact a third product, linters, may bo produced also. This 
can be used for rayon production for example. 
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1.6 What preliminary conclusions may be drawn from these 
experiences? First, the overhead costs of the development, 
extension and research type for a relatively undeveloped industry 
should be borne by central government. The time when such an 
industry is able to contribute towards such expenses needs to 
be carefully evaluated. Second, any statutory marketing organisa-
tion must perform it's services at a minimum cost to the grower. 
Third, a pragmatic attitude must be adopted towards co-operatives. 
It is all too easy for ideological arguments' supporting co-operatives 
to override economic arguments against them. The overall 
objective must not be lost sight of which is _o promote the welfare 
of growers. Fourth, cost plus pricing formulas must not be 
permitted to exist. Fifth, the costs and benefits of subsidising 
certain inputs must be carefully evaluated before such subsidies 
are undertaken. Sixth, where-ever feasible producers must be 
paid the full value of their produce. Seventh, to ensure that 
agricultural research is effective, research workers must be 
informed of research priorities. 
1.7 Rehearsing the physical process which cotton production 
taken as a whole involves; the following stages may be defined; 
(i) individual growers deliver seed cotton to collection points 
or direct to ginneries; 
(ii) collected seed cotton is transported from collection point"', 
to ginneries; 
(iii) ginneries process the seed cotton, producing lint and seed: 
(iv) the lint and seed are sold and transported to the places of 
final utilisation. Effectively these may be textile mills or 
seed crushing mills in Kenya cr points of exit from Kenya; for 
example, Mombasa. Each of these stages in the above production, 
processing and marketing chain will be considered in turn in 
subsequent sections. 
1.8 The appropriate returns to the grower may be expressed by 
the following equation: 
R==P. a + P b - (C ,+C +C tn g 1 s e,t g m,a) (1.1) 
where R = returns to grower in Shs. per unit of seed cotton O 
P^= ex-gin price of lint in shs. per unit; i.e. the gross sale 
price net of any direct marketing costs incurred such as 
transport. 
a = the lint out-turn ratio, normally expressed as a percentage 
with a range of about 20% to 35%; expressed in the equation as 
a decimal. For AR grade seed cotton of' the varieties now 
grown in Kenya, a reasonable figure is 32%. 
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at a later date. Given that a national group of producers now is 
different to a group of products last year and certainly say five 
years ago, and given that it can be assumed that the great majority 
of cotton are likely to have a high time preference rate for liquid 
funds5 probably greater even than a 'normal5 social rate of discount 
commonly applied these days of about 8%, such a price assistance 
fund is very unlikely to .j^e able to properly compensate a particular 
grower for the revenue which he foregoes now in the expectancy of 
being remunerated at a later date? In fact most price assistance 
or .stabilisation funds dont have this in mind and therefore are 
misnamed. Their objectives usually are: -
(i) to act as a source of development funds, not necessarily 
for the particular sector in question;, 
(ii) to siphon off excess 'profits* in times of high product 
prices to prevent the entry into the industry of many 
producers marginal in (a) the technical sense of being 
able to grow the product only with such a high price or 
(b) with a high opportunity cost which the high product price 
overcomes, implying a reallocation of resources into 
production. If product prices subsequently fall then these 
resources may well prove to be misallocated and waste may 
occur; the bigger and more rapid the fall, the more likely 
is it that resource mis-allocation will occur. There may be 
a case for a small reserve fund to be set up (a) to allow 
for errors in trading expectancies; (b) to smooth out the 
annual variations in product prices which can occur. This 
point will be examined more closely below. 
1.15 This reserve fund currently is financed out of growers' incomes. 
Under the present pricing policy all other agents concerned with 
the cotton crop are reimbursed their operating costs and receive 
their theoretical profits whether product prices rise or fall. 
This is unequitable although on economic grounds it would be 
difficult to say how the industry's divident should be shared. 
In the circumstances, rather 'than recommending any arbitrary 
profit or loss sharing scheme, it was recommended that growers' 
returns and ginners' margins should be fixed according to 
forecast product and prices and estimated costs of processing 
and marketing on an annual basis. 
5"Alternatively this may be termed the consumption rate of interest 
There are 'traditional' counter arguments in favour of price 
assistance funds, being essentially the reduction in price 
uncertainty facing small scale producers with low risk bearing 
capacity. See D.G.R. Belshaw, Price and Marketing Policy for 
Uganda?s Export Crops: the Reports of the Cotton and Coffee Committes 
1966/67. Draft paper presented at the EAAES Conference, June 1968. 
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partially offset by an increase in seed price and vice-versa. 
Data presented in Table 1.1 shows that the ratio of average lint 
price to average seed price has varied from about 9.1 to 16.1 
during a ten years period and the technical coefficients, a and b, 
are related in the ratio of approximately 1:2. Taking these 
together a change in seed price on growers returns would have the 
same effect as a change in lint price in the ratio of 45:1 to 8:1. 
In other worcis a. 10% change in Pg could have the same effect on 
R as a 1.25% to 2.2% change in P . Such a change in P could have g X s 
a stabilising on destabilising effect on growers returns. 
1.10. Table 1.1 shows the average lint and seed prices (AR grade) during 
the period 1959/60 to 1968/69 and how average revenue derived 
from these two joint products has varied accordingly. 
Table 1.1 
Average lint and seed prices (AR grade) and average 
revenue, 1959/60 to 1968/69 
Year Lintprice 
Shs/Kg. 
Changeover 
previous 
year 
Seed price 
Shs/Kg. 
1959 
60/61 
61/62 
62/63 
63/64 
64/65 
65/66 
66/67 
67/68 
68/69 
5.76 
5.02 
4.70 
4.44 
4.77 
4.51 
4.15 
4.04 
4.72 
5.47 
-12.8 
-6.4 
-5.5 
+7.4 
-3.4 
-8.0 
-2.0 
+16.8 
+15.9 
0.38 
0.42 
0.30 
0.41 
0.33 
0.40 
0.46 
0.45 
0.50 
0.52 
Average 
revenue" 
cents/Kg 
seed 
cotton 
209.40 
188.36 
170.20 
169.14 
174.4 2 
170.72 
163.16 
158.98 
184.04 
209.36 
Change 
over 
previous 
year 
<k 
- 1 0 . 0 
-9.6 
-0.6 
+3.1 
-1.9 
-4.4 
-2.6 
+15.8 
+13.8 
Note" Based on the equation: Average revenue = 0.32 P + 0.66 P 
Thus in only two years out of the 9 compared was the cnange in 
average revenue greater than that in lint price. During this 
period lint and seed prices taken together tended to have a 
stabilising effect. 
1.11 Is it possible to make predictions on the relative movements of 
lint and seed prices? Given that Kenya is effectively an open 
economy with regard to these two products, it would be difficult 
to support the argument that downward movements in lint prices 
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would be followed by upward movements in seed prices (.and vice 
versa) which would be the case if the Kenya economy was closed, 
and notwithstanding the slim supporting evidence presented in 
Table 1.1. Kenya is a price taker on the world lint market and 
effectively a price taker on the world market not for cotton seed 
alone but for all substitutable oilseeds. Therefore there is no 
reason to argue that compensatory price movement- would be the 
rule although during the past decade or so, they appear to have 
been so in most years. 
1.12. Returning to equation 1.1 and footnote 3 again we see that 
growers returns are directly and inversely affected by the costs 
of seed cotton collection and transport, ginning, marketing and 
administration. Thus a 10% change in any of these costs will 
change growers returns by a same amount but in the reverse direction. 
With the current pricing policy for seed cotton, in the face of 
fluctuating prices for the final products the producer is the sole 
agent in the whole production, processing and marketing chain 
who gets varying returns. In practice the effect of fluctuating 
prices on producer returns is cushioned by the presence of a price 
assistance fund. Thus equation (1.1) becomes: 
In the case of a closed economy for cotton lint and seed the 
following argument would apply. 
Assuming Qs^= -a + bP^ (supply function for cotton lint) 
Qs = 2Qs^ (supply function for cotton seed in joint 
supply with lint) 
Qd =c - dp (demand function for seed for processing) s s 
where Qs and Qd refer to quantity supplied and demanded respectively 
and subscripts 1 and s refer to lint and seed respectively. 
For equilibrium: 
Qs = Qd 
S 6 
2(-a + bP ) = c - dP 1 s 
P =c - dP + 2a 1 s 
P 25 a 1 = -d (2b) 
P 2 a s 4-b 
= ^ d 
2b 
aPs '= 2b 
a -P d 
As both b and d > 0, the negative sign shows that as P^ increases, 
P decreases and vice versa. 
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2. Production, processing and marketing of cotton: a stage by stage 
examination-
2.1 The price which the grower receives for seed cotton is set 
by the Ministry of Agriculture in consultation with the GLSMB. 
These prices (formerly differentiated by growing region but now 
uniform throughout the country) are published under a gazette 
notice usually in July of each e year and cover the following 12 
month period. The gazetted prices are net and on a 'delivered to 
collection point' basis, there being currently no further deductions 
except for loan repayments. There used to be an export tax of 
14.6 cents per 1 lb of seed cotton but this was removed with 
effect from the 1955/6 crop. A cess was imposed during the 
period 1966 to 1968 by the GLSMB of 2 cts and 5 cts per 1 lb of 
AR and grade respectively. This no longer applies although the 
GLSMB has the power to levy this cess if considered appropriate. 
2.2 Two issues merit attention on growers returns. These are: 
(i) should there be regional or zone differentials and if 
so what should be their basis? 
(ii) should there be quality differentials and if so what 
should be their basis? 
2.3 Regional or zone differentials. As stated above there are 
now no regional or ginnery zone differentials in producer prices 
for seed cotton of a similar grade. Such differentials would be 
economically justified (although there may be practical arguments 
aga ins t t hem) if:-
(a) seed cotton collection costs varied widely between 
regions or zones; 
(b) some regions are substantially further from points of 
final marketing than others ana therefore incur higher 
transport costs for the lint; 
(c) there is a strong correiation between regions or zones 
and quality which would be reflected in the final prices 
for lint or seed; 
(d) a necessary condition is that these regions or zones are 
well defined. 
2.4. Seed collection costs. A major variable item of seed collection 
cost is transport. The relevant parameters determining this costs 
are (i) the current per ton mile transport rate which varies from 
about 50 cts in eastern and central regions to about 85 cts in 
western and 
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o£ zones; 
(b) sdtne regions are substantially further from points of final 
matketing than others and therefore incur higher transport 
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3Ct cts in eastern and central regions to about 85 cts in western and 
/ 
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lake regions f Cii) the -average_di stance- oiLgrowers from the.^gixmery. Thus 
far-spread growers in a high transport cost region should receive less than 
growers located close to ginneries inatow transport cest region, Bie 
advantage of adopting this policy is that cotton production would receive an 
incentive to be carried out in lower transport cost regions close to the 
ginneries. However, the actual cost differences in terms of say per kg of 
seed cotton would be very small and it might not be considered fair to make 
the location of the gin within a particular zone (which may well have been 
on an arbitrary basis) a factor influencing individual producer returns. It 
will be seen that the actual cost of transporting seed cotton varies from 
0,05 cts to 0,085 cts per kg per mile. If differentials of at least 0,5 cts s 
per kg are to be maintained, these 2£nes could be fairly broad i.e. between 
10 and 7 miles according to the co§t of transport in the area. In other 
words._in low,.transport c»sfc areas to incur a 1 cent/Kg price differential the 
grower would have to be delivering to a collection point 20 miles from the 
ginj in a high transport cost region, to incur the same 'penalty1, he would 
have to be at least 14 miles away. The advantages of introducing such a 
pricing pelicy are first some groups of growers are not, in effect, subsidising 
others; second, seed collection transport costs are automatically covered 
bscaose the further the ginner would haw travel to obtain seed cotton, the 
less would be the minimum price he would have to offer.^ 
2*5, Lint transport costs. The locational price differentials incurred on lint 
transport are those from ginnery to railway head and hence to Mombasa for 
expofrt-and to the textile mill if consumed locally. Most AR lint is exported 
and therefore a logical pricing starting point is Mombasa. Most BR lint 
is consumed in bcal mills and therefore is price - locationally indeterminate 
unless an export parity pricing policy is adopted for these sales. Hie same 
applies to seed of any grade as it is consumed locally. The actual road 
transport element from ginnery to railhead in lint transport costs can be 
ignored in most cases at the seed cotton level because about 3 kg of seed 
cotton are required for the production of 1 kg of lint and the costs must 
be discounted accordingly. The exception is the transporting of lint from 
Larnu to Mombasa by road which costs about shs 16/- per bale of 185 kg. This 
would imply a transport cost of 3 cents per kg of seed cotton. There is 
a favourable railway tariff (scale 10) for lint for export. Examples of 
costs are shs 10.45 and shs 3.00 per 100 kg from Kisumu and Voi respectively 
i 
J. The standard economic argqueiiy. - uiixxotui prxcxixg j-ut' growers oasea 
on the intensive - extensive margin of production issiie, is not an easy 
one to put over to technically orientated policy makers. The farmers, 
though, usually appreciate the cross subsidi^tion argument xbLle policy 
makers realise that transport costs have to be covered somehow. See appendix, 
( i ( 
i i 
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i 
Rg (AR) - Rg (BR) = (F^ + Psb) M - a + Psb)BR 2.1 
Looking at each of the variables on the right hand side of the 
equation in turn, the difference in the lint price, between 
AR and BR grades was shs. 1.76 per kg in 1969 although this 
difference has varied between shs 1.87 to about 95 cents per kg 
during the period 1964 to 1968. The difference in a,lint out-turn 
/ 
ratiojis of the ordetf of 3%, i.e. .'-•• 327. for AR grade and 29% 
for BR grade. Thus^ v a is about 0,03. The difference in AR and 
BR seed prices also varies from year to year. 
In recent years it appears to be widening to about shs. 200 per 
metric ton from about shs 150 «* 160 in 1966/67. The figure of 
shs 200 will be taken, i.e. 20 cents per kg. There may be a slight 
difference in the quantities of AR or 3R seed obtained from say 
a kg of AR or BR seed cotton, but aoat of the difference in lint 
out-turn ratio i$ asounted for by a higher wastage figure for the 
BR grade. Therefore this will be ignored. 
Rearranging equation 2.1 and allowing for the difference in 
ginning costs between the two grades: 
Rg(AR)-Rg(BR)*P1a(AR)-P1a(BR)+b£" Pg(AR) - ?s (BR)_J »ACg(AR,BR) 2.2 
where, as stated in paragraph 2.6 above., normally Cg<^0 because 
Cg(AR)<( Cg(BR), Therefore inserting the above values we gets 
^Rg(AR,BR) shs = (4.84x0.32)-(3.08x.29)+<0.66x0.20) + 0.005 
= 1.550-0.895+0.132 +0.005 
= 0.655+0.132+0.005 
= 0.792 
The conclusion which may be drawn is that given recent prices for AR 
and BR lint and seed and using realistic lint and seed out-turn ratios, 
the current AR/3R seed cotton price differential is too narrow. On the 
other hand it seems that during the last few months the prices of BR 
lint have been such that the differential between the AR & BR grades 
at the growers' level c6uld be narrower still* However this does not 
affect the recommendation made that there should not be a fixed and 
arbitrary price differential between AR and BR 'seed cotton but the 
priee for each grade should be calculated separately on estimates of 
\ market prices for AR and BR lint and seed. 
In Section 1.14 above it was stated that price assistance or 
i \ stabilisation funds tended to operate against the interest of cotton 
growers who would be expected to have a high tim^ preference rate 
\ • 
V 
\ 
\ 
\ 
' \ 
/ 
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for liquid fundsThey may be justified (a) to provide a reserve 
l 
against inaccurate forecast of market prices; (b) to prevent very 
violent price fluctuations from causing\ misallocation of resources 
either into or out of the industry. In fact if temporarily lint 
and seed prices were such that growers prices were very encouraging 
for new. marginal entrants into the industry, a tax could be imposed 
to siphon off these 'excess' earnings whicl} could be termed a windfall gain. 
On the other hand chronically depressed prices would leaye the government 
with the following choice: either allow thfe industry to eoiifcract'or 
to subsidize it. Therefore the resource allocation argument for creating 
a price assistance fund is not very strong. Additionally by introducing 
a pricing policy whereby other agents in the processing and marketing 
chain share the ups and downs of the prices of final products and not 
just the grower of seed cotton, this too will have a dampening effect on 
fluctuations in growers' returns. In 1968/69 the CLSMB achieved a net 
surplus of £113,378, equivalent to about 17.57, of total payments to 
growers in that year, and thetoni^ caseason -for a •smaller surplus-during 
"year is 'irtghjar "-costs. Surpluses of these 
magnitudes aro considered to be excessive, can lead to wasteful 
administration and would be far better in the growers' hands. Hie issue 
of the level of working capital seeded by the CLSMB to carry out its 
functions will be discussed in i section devoted to the Board but it i 
does seem thai; only a relative^ small reserve fund is required to overcome 
errors in pride forecasts, say ab?ut 5% of the total annual payout to 
growers. This would imply a figU?e of say £ 35,000 to £ 50,000, It 
was recommended !that as a matter cf principle the CLSMB or its successor i 
should pass ontci the grower the largest possible portion of the value 
of the cotton crpp implying that tie size of its trading surpluses will 
be minimised. The other implication of course is that the-jaaxkatiag 1 .' I 
agency maices accurate forecasts of lint and seed prices. 
., I. . . I ' ' w — iu. . ., . ... ...... 
10. To be absoli^ely on this issue, if the trading surpluses and losses 
of the CLSMB (i.e. remova.^ from and additions to growers' returns respectively) 
* are-added upj from, say, 1954/56 to the 1969/70 and assuming a trading 
surplus-of 200,000 during this last year, a total net 'benefit' of about 
£96 j 000 will} have been received/by growers over that period. Compounding 
at 87o gives & net 'benefit* of nearly.£131,500. On the other hand this was 
possible simply because considerable fuatfs accumulated during the period 
up to 1955/6 so that if this calculation was ^ tended back over a longer 
period, there is no doubt that tie 'costs' would hasre exceeded the 'benefits*. 
Again, th^  presence of such substantial funds permitted growers* prices to be 
topped up in times of relatively low lint price® without having to make,other 
economies in. the processing...arid-marketing chain. 
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2.8. It might be advisable to summarise briefly the foregoing section. 
The overall, objective is that given prices for lint and seed, growers 
returns should be maximised and that there should be no subsidisation 
of one group of producers by another nor by one grade of seed cotton 
by another,, A simple equation can be used to calculate growers* 
returns from forecasts of lint and seed prices, and given estimated 
average costs of seed cotton Collection and transportation, ginning 
and overhead marketing and administration. 
The growers retutns would be on a regional basis depending on 
the average quality expected from the region (it being difficult to 
apply quality premia on an individual grower basis) and on the 
propinquity of the region to consuming areas which, in turn, may 
be wofked back to an export parity price. Seed cotton prices for 
AR and BR grades should be calculated separately on the basis of i 
expected prices for AR and BR lint and seed and they may have a 
transport deduction made according to the distance of collection points 
from ginneries. Forecasts and estimates cf prices have beennentioned 
frequently. It is one of the main functions of the CLSMB or its 
successor to make such forecasts and to make them as accurately as 
possible. Inevitably errors will be made in these forecasts which the 
presence of a small trading reserve may not overcome. Given that 
growers* prices must be made in advance of planting, mid seasonal 
adjustments may have to be nsade or simply the adjustment is made in the 
following year's price. It is up to the CLSMB to decide which of these 
two strategies is the most practicable and less discriminatory between 
individual growersc In order to restore and maintain grower's confidence 
in the crop it might be considered advisable to determine growers' prices 
for periods of up to 3 years or so. The main disadvantages of such a 
scheme are that if the marketing board is held responsible, then a very 
conservative price is likely to be determined; if the Government 
guarantees it, then the marketing board may be unduly optimistic. 
Certainly its success or failure depends largely on the accuracy of 
the marketing agency's long term price forecasts. 
1 U In fact if estimated 'normal' ginning costs are averaged over the 
country rather than for e£ch ginnery, some cross subsidisation does 
remain; that is growers supplying more efficient ginneries are 
subsidising growers supplying Less efficient growers if a uniform 
growers* price is paid. \ 
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3, The collection and transportation of seed cotton 
3.1* The physical process of this stage of cotton production 
is as follows. The grower delivers £eed cotton to collection 
points where it is weighed and graded in£o AR and BR grades, the 
grower receiving the gazetted price, Tne bagged seed cotton is then 
stored until transported to the ginnery. Normally the ginnery would 
act as its own buying agent or hire agents to work on its behalf and 
this is still the esse of ginneries at Kitui and on the coast. 
Elsewhere inNyanBs and Western Provinces and, more lately, in Central 
Province, cotton co-operative societies were formed to act as buying 
agents. In all Nyanza and western areas these primary societies were 
grouped into varipus Unions but this has served little purpose yet 
has raised the costs of buying aKd transporting. Two unions subsequently 
were suspended and currently Na^bare and Malakisi ginneries deal 
directly withe the frimary^sociaties, 2he names of the remaining unions 
i ' • 
and the receiving ginneries follows: 
Rachuorryo FCU <= delivering to Kendu Bay ginnery 
Bondo/Ul^ rala FCU- " ; 11 Ndere Ginnery 
Luanda ftcu - " " Samia ginnery 
Kisumu' FCU formerly delivered to the Kibos ginnery but 
now t^ elivers to Ndete. 
Victoria FCU formerly. delivered to the Homa Bay ginnery 
tyjt now deliver a/so to Kendu Bay. 
3.2, yhxro issues have ;o be resolved. What is the appropriate 
role of growers co-operatitfes in seed cotton buying and how should 
buying agents whether tbey are the ginneries themselves, private 
/ 
individuals or co-operatives be remunerated?. They will be considered 
in turn. 
3.3. The role o^ co-operatives in seed cotton buying. One o£ 
the terms of reference of the Working Party for which this paper was 
originally prepared/was concerned with the whole role of the co-operative 
movement in the cotton industry. Therefore this issue was discussed 
at some length nor really justified here. The main conclusion reached 
was that if primary societies were able to provida-to^all cotton growers 
__—ia--an-axea_ciit7sdequate service of -collectings and, if necessary, 
transporting Seed cotton at a competitive cost, then their activities 
could be prenptfid* In fact^the primary societies proved to be 
' / 
- , \ / / 
/ / \ /• . / / ' \ / 
v.. X 
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reasonably efficient (at least they seem to be able to survive 
with the faixfy generous commission paid to them - see following 
paragraph); the co-operative unions were not, providing few 
if any additional services while receiving a coranission separately 
negotiated with the CLSMB. For example, tljie buying comniisions 
payable to unions (as opposed to societies) for the current buying 
season are as follows: \ 
{ i i 
Table 3.1 
Buying commission payable to unions 1970/71 
| 
Name Ginnery Commission cents/Kg 
, t 
Rachuonyo Kendu Bay j 7.32 
Victoria » " | 8,29 I 
Kisumu Ndere 12.67 
Bondo/Ukwala Ndere j 6.70 
Luanda Samia 7.03 
. i 
j 
The difference between jthese-costs^may be explained partially by 
different transport costs involved. For example both Victoria 
and Rachuonyo FCUfl deliver to Kendu Bay but the f ormer union used to 
deliver to Homa Bay ginnery (now aileneed) and therefore is likely 
to incur additional transport costs ~ Kendu Bay is some 20 miles 
. A 
from Homa Bay. If a reasonable transport Charge is 85 cents per 
metric ton mile (0.085 cents per Kg mils) fc;hen the extra costs incurred 
on average will be 1.7 cents per Kg. The difference between Victoria 
and Rachuonyo commissions is 0.97 per Kg, implying that Rachuonyo 
FCU is possibly incurring higher collecting costs then Victoria FCU« 
in fact the commission paid by the CLSIZ3 to the Unions is not consistent 
but depends ifiainly on the size of crop handled by each union, A 
Union with a relatively low 5throughput* tends to have a higher comaission 
per unit ofe seed cotton than one with a high throughput because the 
costs of administration are essentially fixed and have to be covered 
that it was not a function of the CLSMB \ for the services provided on a consistent^, to subsidize indiadAiai inrtrms in tjay- hiLi- - fn rpiwhitr^J^mi / 
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basis.ilf individual Unions-could/survive under such a policy, this 
• 
would be matter for consideration by the Department of Co-operative 
Development. Amalgamation of small, non-viable Unions with each other 
or with adjoining larger cans' may be a solution in these cases. 
The remuneration of seed cotton buying agents. Buying agents, 
whatever they are, receive a commission from the CLSMB, the standard 
rate being 4 cents per Kg payable through the ginneries to which 
deliveries are made, If ginneries act as their own buying agents 
then they receive this commission directly. If seed cotton collection 
is undertaken by co-operative unions as opposed to primary societies 
then, as we have seen, an additional commission is paid although this 
is partially offset by the unions undertaking the transportation of 
.seed cotton to the ginneries. In addition the ginneries are responsible 
for various expenditures incurred in buying seed cotton and they are 
reimbursed under the Lint Price Formula0 The first 19 items of this 
Formula cover buying at the ginnery <_r store. With the demise of the 
Lint Price Formula (see section 4) some means has to be devised of 
remunerating buying agents. This problem only arises when these agents 
are economically distinguishable from the ginnery owners. When the 
buying agents are employed by the ginnery then there is no problem 
because the. costs of buying and transportation would come within the 
margin between the growers® price and the prices received by the ginnery 
• ' 
for the final products. Thus the buying function can be considered 
patt of the ginning functiori and rightly so. It is in the interests of 
the ginnery owner to attempt to operate at an economic throughput and 
therefore has an incentive both to promote cotton production in his 
catchment area and make the collection process as efficient as possible. 
Howeyer when, for example, co-operative societies purchase on behalf 
of private ginneries, then to prevent these ginneries exploiting their 
monopsonies tic position, a buyers' dommission has to be determined. It 
is considered that th? setting up of a separate buying structure such 
as gropJrersv co-operatives between growers and ginneries is a retrogressive' 
I (• I Y step in terms of the promotion of the efficiency of the collection and 
' I If T \ \ 
delivery of seed cotton. Growers are protected from exploitation by 
ginneries by prices being set by the pLSMB and therefore there is no 
need £br them to co-operate as a mearts of creating countervailing 12 < " ~ *If growers' priccs are on an into~giimery basis then such commissions 
wou^d be included in the margin between this price and what the grower 
acti^ ally receives. See 7. Para 2,4 and Appendix. 
/ 
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power. Buying co-operaiive will have an incentive to maximise 
their collections but w(ll be far less directly concerned with the 
efficiency and timeliness of deliveries. Therefore this buying and 
ginning dichotomy must be regarded as only an intermediate stage 
in the development of the cotton industry. There appear to be two 
separate issues,.. The iirst is how to cover the actual buying costfe -
/ buyers* remuneration, stores rent and repair, scales, gunnies, 
twine and transport of cash; the second is the transportation cost 
t ! 
from stores tjo the ginnery* Each will be examined separately. 
Buying costs. these may be divided into fixed and variable. 
The first will be-buying-li/»«as®df atcre. rent and repairs j seal©--"" 
depreciation (ignoring;the variabl«"wear element) and transport cost 
of cash} Yaria&le will be gunnies and twine used and insuranfce of 
cash. Buyers* remuneration could be regarded as. a fixed cost. An 
examination of the quantities of seed cotton purchased from co-operative 
society /stores serving the Nambare ginnery in 1969/70 reveals that 
the ranee was from about 56,000 to 176,000 Kg (excluding purchases 
made at the ginnery itself. If the buying commission was at a rate 
of 4 cents per Kg. this would imply a buyers* income of from shs. 2240 
to shs. 7040 for a 5»6 month buying season. This would appear to be 
rather high.. Therefore it was recommended that either those commission 
rzjb&s eould be maintained but buying agents would have to bear all 
buying epsts involved or that they eould be reduced, the ginnery 
providing gunnies, twine, seales etc. The simplest^ttourae, which will 
bje disepssed in a following section, is for eo-operative societies 
to have an interest in the ginnery itself when this division between 
the buying and ginning functions will be erssed. If it was considered 
that co-operative societies would be unable to perform the cellection ! f 
function if the commission was reduced or effectively their costs were 
raised and "this would be . detrisjeotal'. to growers* long run interests, 
it might be necessary to continue the 4 cents/Kg commission for the time 
being«.without requiring societies to bear additional buying costs. This 
argument could be supported cn ' infant industry grounds. However, in 
(to the other hand if the collection of seed cotton is undertaken by 
co-operative soeietie6 there is less- likelihood of seed cotton b^ing 
unfairly downgraded than if ginneries operated their own collections. 
AU these s^rts of problems should resolve themselves when co-operative 
societies and henee .member growers have a financial interest in the 
ginning function itself although presumably non-member-growers could 
still be discriminated against. / 
! / 
/ 
these cases the inputs provided by the tinners towards, the- buying^ 
function would have to be included in the 'normal' ginning margin -
allowed and this would lead to extra complications* 
3*6. Transport costs. Again this is mcsjfc effectively organised by 
the ginnery itself and if co-operatives tan obtain a share in 
ginneries then the co-operatives and ginaeries interests will 
coincide: namely to deliver seed cotton as\ cheaply and efficiently 
14 as possible." Under section 2.4 above, sefljj cotton transport 
costs were considered. It was recommended tl^ at growers should, in 
! 
effect, pay for the costs of transport by receiving prices according 
to the distance between the delivery point and the ginnery. Thus, 
the greater the distance, the lower the price* If this price 
differential is geared to the transport cost on a zone basis, then as 
the seed cotton catchment-area becomes wider, to the ginning margin 
(i.e. ginners revenue less value of seed cottott purchases per ijpstt. 
handled) will tend to widen also. In other words transport costs will 
be automatically covered if growers' prices are zoned according to 
the distance of collection points from ginneries. Therefore if the 
recommendation made under section 2.4 is- not followed., the whole series 
of problems emerges on how to reimburse transport agents whether they 
are co-operatives or ginnery owners, how to assess transport costs and 
how to ensure that transportation is being performed at least cost.?"* 
14. It could be argued that one of a large group of societies having an 
interest in a ginnery could be a high Cost seed cotton collection agent 
without significantly affecting its profits obtained from its share of 
the ginnery, 
15« It does not make any difference whether growers prices are gazetted on 
an 'at collection point' basis with collection and transport margins 
added or on an 'into-ginnery' basis with these margins deducted.. 
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4. Ginning* 
4.1. Some of the most intractable problems facing the cotton industry • 
in Kenya lie within the processing stage of the crop, that ia ginning. 
The three main problem areas are first, how should ginnery owners 
be remunerated; second what should be the ownership and management 
structure of ginneries; third how to rationalise ginning capacity in 
the country to ensure that these resources.are being efficiently 
utilisedi 
4.2, The current ginning capacity and ownership situation is presented 
in the following table. 
Table 4.1 
Current ginning capacity, utilization and ownership, Kenya 
Name ." • Ownership Capacity Throughput 
Western/Nyanza Bales in 1969 season 
Nambare CLSMB 6000 3849 
Malakisi Produce Dealers & Millers 5000 2685 
Ndere Kenya Industries Ltd 5000 1420 
Kibos* CLSMB 3500 a 
Samia Small & Co. 8000 2505 
Kendu Bay ii 5000 1837 
Homa Bay* rt 5000 
Sub Total 37500 12296 
Eastern Kitui Abdulali Jiwaji 8000 8490 
Coast Malindi Malindi Ginners Ltd 9250 609 
Lamu Laou Ginners Ltd 3000 1592 
* Ginnery temporarily silenced. 
There is also a ginnery recently opened at Mwea, jointly owned by the 
CLSKB and the Mwea Co-operative Society. The 1970/71 season, not yet 
completed, is its first. 
4.3. Ginners remuneration. The joint products of seed cotton processing 
are cotton lint and seed. Under free market conditions the revenue 
derived from the sale of these products would accrue to the ginneries and 
this sum, less the cost of seed cotton purchased would constitute the 
ginners gross* margin. The current policy of the CLSMB is to remunerate 
ginners on the basis of a Lint Price Formula originating in Uganda and 
used in Kenya since 1956. This is essentially a cost plus formula with 
ginners being reimbursed all expenses under 55 separate headings based 
on estimates of costs incurred in a "hypothetical" ginnery of an output 
» 2 1 • 
of 2400 bales of lint per season (1500 in the case of Lamu) plus two 
heads of profits' for the buying and ginning function: \ cent and 
5% cents per lb of lint respectively. The GLSMB stipulates average 
lint out-turn percentages t<j calculate the number of bales of lint and 
quantities of seed expected Jrom the deliveries of seed cotton. The 'I 
calculated ginning margin per lb of lint produced is then added to the 
seed cotton price also expressed in terms of lint and this amounts to the 
ex-gin price. -Additional (arbitrary) allowances are given for BR lint 
which has a lower lint out-turr. percentage and higher ginning costs. 
Cotton seed is not paid for by the CLSMB except weighing and bagging 
costs and a commission for handling of seed used for planting purposes. 
4.4. It is difficult to criticise in strong enough terms this 
administratively burdensome, highly inefficient and completely arbitrary 
cost-plus pricing formula. Suffice it to say that it has resulted in 
high profits being earned by ginners which explains the present excess 
capacity in the industry. In 1968/9 Nambare ginnery acquired by the 
CLSMB the previous year and therefore without much experience behind 
them, achieved a net profit of about £8,300 excluding profits on 
transportation, on an investment of £30,000. The budget for 1969/70 
for Nambare forecasts a trading profit of about £ 16,000 mainly because 
of increasing throughput. It was recommended that the Lint Price formula 
should be abandoned forthwith, 
4.5.- An amendment proposed by the CLSMB is to simply pay ginners at 
a rate more in line with actual costs incurred at the CLSMS ginnery at 
Nambare. The suggested ex-gin lint price is shs. 1.85 per lb (shs. 4.07 
per Kg) which is comparable with that pertaining in neighbouring 
countries and a saving of about 15-20 cents per lb (shs 32-44 cents 
per Kg) over current prices. It implies a ginnerls gross margin of about 
16 
24.5 cents per Kg of seed cotton. This proposal does have the advantages 
of being administratively simple and of reducing the ginning margin but 
is not theoretically efficient. ^ 
be simply calculated from the following: 
= aP, - R 1 1 g 
= ginner's margin in cents per unit weight of seed cotton. 
= ex-gin price of lint in cents per unit weight. 
= growers return in cents per unit weight of seed cotton. 
= lint out-turn ratio. 
= 407(0.33) - 110 
= 24.5 cents per Kg or just over 11 cents per lb of seed cotton. 
16, This may 
G m 
where G m 
P1 R 
aS 
Thus G m 
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4.6, The main objectives of a pricing policy applied to ginning should 
be to (a) reduce ginners Margins so that profits are less excessive; 
(b) to increase throughput so that ginning resources are more efficiently 
utilised (average costs of ginning are reduced); (c) unless there is • 
i a*iiriSi a good case for supporting them,- to permit uneconomic resources involved 
in ginning to transfer to alternative uses. The main problems are that 
- • • i \ ' • •" !l '" ' . ''' ""V WWl 
first there is not a great deal of information readily available on the .„•;?•  
cost functions of ginning in Kenya ' (CLSM3 have only 3 years*' experience ^ 
gained at Nambare and this was to some extent a learnihg process); 
ginners have to pay a fixed price to producers and therefore find it 
difficult to increase throughput. A preliminary examination of Nambare 
ginnery's costs shows that ginning variable costs (including purchasing •r 
of seed 4otton).is almost constant over a wide range of output implying 
that average costs are still falling - (in 1968/9 Nambare operated at 
about 60% of capacity: this is expected to rise to 75% during this current 
season). This ignorance of true ginning cost functions in Kenya (those 
gathered in the past for the Lint Priee Formula calculations are not 
likely to be 'true') is a serious handicap to evolving an efficient 
formula for remunerating ginneries. However, seme suggestions can be 
made and these are put forward for consideration. 
4;7. (i) Ginners should be paid both the lint and seed produced and 
not the lint alone. It is quite erroneous to pay gingers for only one j 
of the joint products produced. Ginning costs are incurred to transform 
raw cotton into lint and seed. j 
(iij Somewhere the overhead costs of administration and marketing 
have to be borne by the industry. That is, there has to be some adminis-
trative and marketing structure even if marketed oUtput is very low and 
the size of this structure would not be expected to^ry significantly 
over a fairly large range in marketed output of the industry. Also, of 
course, these truly overhead costs cannot be allocated between the joint 
products of lint and seed, nor should they be. TVo alternative approaches 
are suggested as follows. V - \ 1 
4.8. \ The Lump Sum approach. Here these costs are regarded as an 
ovohead charge which is divided up between ginneries according to their 
rated capacity as a form of lump sum 'tax* e.g. shs 30/- per bale of 
rated capacity although this"-would vary according to the total capacity 
of the industry and the total overhead cost. On the other hand, the 
17v, As might be expected there is some fairly detailed information available 
on ginning costs in Uganda. For example see the 1962 Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the cotton-Ginning Industry of Ug&ida^op. cit. 
Unfortunately the cost data given in Appendix XI of that report is not 
linked with any information on throughput* 
• • • • 
' }.-'••.''• .. 
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only deductions made-to. ex~gin -lint & seed.prices-would be the true 
allocable costs of marketing lint and seed; e.g. transport and 
handling. In this approach, the ginners monthly, say, returns would 
be according to the following equation: 
Gp = xPl + yPs " S 4.1 
where G^ = monthly parent to ginners in shs 
x = quantity of lint produced at ex-gin price P^ 
y s= quantity of seed produced at ex-gin price Pg 
S = lump sum tax divided Up into monthly instalments over the 
ginning period. 
Ginners gross returns in terms o£ seed cotton processed will be 
according tot-
Cg» = a« (xr1 +yPs) - S(a') 
x 
= a» (xPL + yPg - S) 4.2. 
x 
where the new variables are 
Cg' = actual ginners returns 
a* = lint out-turn ratio obtained, 
and assuming y = x a1 , where b' is the actual seed •out-turn ratio obtained. 
tT 
dearly Gg' will increase both as a«, the lint out-turn ratio and x the 
quantity of lint produced, i.e. throughput}increase. This is desirable 
This approach &lso is administratively simple because the only ginning 
variable which the marketing agency has to estimate annually is S, the 
18 
fixed charge. 
4.9. The average cost approach. Here overhead administration and 
marketing costs are averaged over the crop handled (in terms of seed 
cotton of course to avoid the problems of allocating then to either 
lint or seed) and therefore are regarded as a form of specific »tax», 
a deduction being made from the ginners' margin per unit of seed cotton 
processed. True allocable costs again would be deducted from the 
ex-gin prices of lint and seed. According to this approach the ginners 
will be remunerated according to the following formula derived from 
equation 1.1 above. 
The ginnerd actual net returns per unit of seed cotton i.e. net of 
payments to growers, will be according to:-
where R = price payable to growers per unit cf seed cotton. 
m 24 «= 
G = xP + yP - (C* ) x 4.3. p 1 s m,a 
where hew variables are 
0* s= calculated average overhead cost of marketing and ••...-,•..;• 
. , m > a ... ...... .',;, ; . • ' ' ' • ' ' . • 
administration per unit of seed cotton. , • 
a*= stipulated lint out-turn ratio H 
k . • M l ? ' • •• 
i - • • V- & 
J • . • • • Here the marketing agency has to calculate the average overhead ' a 
cost requiring forecasts of both costs and crop size. Also a lint 
\ .19 out-turn ratio has to be stipulated. 
4,10, F-t-qci paragraphs 4,8 and 4,9 above it will be seen that the \ . 4 ;..' - r •lump sujn' approach has distinct practical advantages over the'everage cost* 
approach* It has also the theoretical advance that the addition of a • •' $ 
1 i . : lump sum to a firm's costs will not affect its marginal cost curve, 
! 
Thus a pjrofit maximising firm facing a limp sum 'tax* will not alter its 
level of'i throughput . Again, a firm operating at less than the technical 
\ ' " ; optimum Capacity with this addition to overhead costs will have an i • 
.! J J 
r f 
•19. By this approach, the ginners actual net returns per unit of seed 
eotton, -.processed will be according to: = 
G a'P, + b'P - (C* + R ) 19a g* 1 s m,a g 
although, strictly speakingjhe shouli get:-
a'PU + b'P - /"*C* Q ( ** ) + R ~ 7 1 s - m,a T7 S-
i i because he will have processed £ units of seed cotton to obtain 
i according to 19a, one unit of lint but presumed to have used -j^units. Thus/if a»>2P«, 
implying greater technical efficiency, the ginner is penalised; if 
a* fttimplying leas technical efficiency, the ginner benefits. This 
is not desirable, 
20• With the jLuznp sum 'tax*, the ginner's profit is 
Gp = R(q) - G(q) - S 20a 
where G is his net profit and S is the lympsum 'tax*,Setting the 
derivat?ve of 20a equal to zero 
dG L R*(q) - C'(q) = 0 R'(q) = G»(q) 
f 
incentive to increase throughput, i.e. reduce average overhead costs, 
or possibly go out of business. On the other hand, the average cost M 
I approach Jlmplyittg a specific tax, will reduce throughput if the ginner 
was profit maximising before ^ while if it was operating at less 
than technical eapacity it will have a smaller or greater incentive to 
increase ^throughput depending on the shape of M s average total eost 
curve. 
4.11. Thiri being said the author appreciated that, for the time being 
25 -
at least^ - -either -of..Jiheag -approaches-might-appear..to be rather too 
radical and there is tht practical problem of a lack of actual ginning 
cost dta. As the most important issup is to get irid of the present 
l • i * 
Lint Price Formula as ripidly as possible, a quick and practical 
< ' • 
approach would be to tsfce the current ftambare ginning margins, apply 
them to the industry ant see what happens. If ginneries threaten to 
go out of business i£ it is in t£ie national interest, individual 
• ' ) • • 
ginneries could be botght out, subsidised or the overall margin raised. 
Although not necessarily the best solution this would be a pragmatic 
approach to solving the problem of rationalisation of current ginning 
capacity. 
4*12. Pursuing this line further, it seems that Nambare's cost structure 
is as follows; 
Overhead costs £ 10,700 
Variable costs 19,7 centsfc© 11.9 cents per Kg as throughput 
increased from 2300 to 4500 bales per annum. However, these costs 
must be regarded as very tentative as they relate to three ginning 
seasons to 1959/70, the latter being the budgeted costs. Jfotv.j 
these do seem to indiiate that as output increases from about 30% to 
75% of capacity, average fixed costs decline from nearly 16 cts to just 
over 8 cts per Kg of seed cotton. Average variable costs might be put 
at say 12 cents per K; because the early figure obtained <sf nearly 20 cts 
probably was due to iiexperience as much as anything. Allowing for 
•normal* profits of jay 10% on the capital invested when a throughput of 
75% has been obtaired would give an average total cost of production 
of 22 cents per Kg cseed cotton. The CLSMB recommends that the ginners 
margin should be rgiuced to 35 eents per lb of lint or 11.2 ets per lb 
20 (cont.) Thus S van.shes upon differentiation and the ginner maximises 
his profit by setting marginal eost equal to marginal revenue. With the 
specific 'tax* imrlied in the variable cost approach, ginner's profit 
now becomes 
3 = R(0 - C(q) -sq 20b P 
where s s? specific ftax' 
and dG R»(q, ~ C*(q) - s = 0 R»(q) =-" C«(q) + s 
dq "V --
Thus-the-ginfier maximiaas-his-profit by setting marginal eost plus the 
specific *tay' equal to marginal revenue. As sale prices are predetermined 
.-'-'"by the flsrteJting agency, throughput will tend to decline. 
j L 
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seed cotton at an out-turn ratio of 32%. This is equivalent to 
24.3 cts per Kg. of seed cotton, perhaps a reasonable starting 
point would be a ginners* margin ^ cts per Kg of seed cotton processed. 
This could be revised in the lighl of experience. Additionally when 
the GLSMB or its successor has control of all ginneries in a Contiguous 
zone, it may allocate supplies oI seed cotton between them to equalise 
their marginal costs* 
4.13. It was recommended also tijat (a) ginners should be permitted to 
pay more than the target price to growers set by the CLSMB; (b) they 
should be responsible for remunerating collection agents, this cost 
being included in their margin although the.minimum commission will be 
set by the CLSMB$ (c) th 
at gihners should provide their own working 
capital. The requirement for this will be minimised by the CLSMB 
paying ginners for lint and Seed produced on a monthly basis and storage 
allowances would have to be paid for uncollected lint and seed. In 
fact recommendations (b) and (c) only would be confirming current practice 
but (a) would be something of a radical departure from it. The •objective 
is to try to instil a modicum of competition in the ginning industry to 
obtain a rationalisation of ginning capacity and possibly enhance growers returns. The main argument against this recommendation is that ginneries / > 
owned by co-operatives with limited experience and funds could not engage 
in a price war with experienced private ginners backed up with considerable 
resources. This is probably true in which ease each ginnery eould be 
given a zotU in which it has monopsonistie powers but ttere would be 
outlying areas where competition could exist. In effect this would amount 
probably to ginners taking over the cost of transporting seed cotton and 
not the grower. Furthermore, again on ^ infant industry grounds, co-operative 
ginneries could be protected by requiring them to pay a smaller lump sum 
or specific 'tax1 than private ginners where there was competition between 
them. 
4.14. The ownership of ginneries. As a matter of policy it is thought 
to be in the interests of cotton growers that they, should have a 
financial interest in_.the-ginning industry. However, co-operatives 
should be allowed to develop the capacity to manage them efficiently. 
Therefore it was recommended that any co-operative ownership of 
ginneries should be on a partnership basis with the Government through 
21. There is a long discussion of this issue in the 1962 Ugandan Comm. 
of Inquiry, op. eit. See chapter V, paras 183-194 and chapter VI. 
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the CLSMB or its successor. With additional experience co-operatives 
may acquire complete control of ginneries. Ginneries should be 
purchased on a willing buyer = willing seller basis only in those cases 
where co-operative societies have sufficient membership to enable 
shares to be 'purchased1 over a reS^onable period of 
' i f 
M 
• : 
time. Additionally, v.^Vj 
curchase anv einnerv •-.-: the CLSKB or its successor.should h^ve the powers to p y g y
offered to it. ; 
15. Perhaps it needs to be stated that the recommended pricing policy 
is appropriate whoever owns the actual ginning resources* The CLSMB as 
a managing agent of a ginnery can be separated from its role as a 
marketing and administrative organisation. The co-operatives, too, 
in their own interests should noft be pemtted to earn excess profits 
( as ginners on the argument that ;these will be passed back to growers. 
First, excess profits tend to promote waste, and second, as ginning 
\ 
companies, co-operatives will be liable to corporation tax and rightly 
so. Third, it is unlikely that ;ginneties will be exclusively owned 
by co-operatives for at least scsne time to come and therefore ginning 
profits will have to be shared tffo the CLSMB or its successor. Fourth, 
m Wm 
mm mm 
growers may wish to deliver to ginneries partially owned by co-operatives //• 
but they may not be members of them, 
16. The purchase of ginneries. To avoid having to base the ginnery / •' 'V •*' 
paaxhase price on an intrinsic valuation or replacement cost basis, if 
7 
was refcommended that the purchase price should be based on tip estimated 
present value of expected profits over the outstanding life spanKof the • 
investment. In addition to avoiding difficulties of valpdtioh of assets, 
the-stream of fcifcrerprofits should be based on pricing'policies recommended••••:• 
for thev future and not on.-past policies. Additionally evidence supporting f^Y.sf'v' 
claims ynder the previous Lint Price formula would also provide evidence 
i , : / ,/ f/ [ to support a ginnery buyers1 claims that future profits, given the ginnery's. 
cost stifocture and future'price policies, would not be more than 'normal V 
The rate' of discount used in these estimates should bte set at a current .V : „-. • 
social rate of, say, 8%. implicationof this statement is that the 
CLSMB and the co-operatives should.npt,enter into negotiations for the 
purchase of ginneries until the effects of the recommended changes in gin-
ners' remuneration are known. Otherwise there might ..be-:the temptation-, 
to continue th^ present Lint Price Formula simply to~"keep these newly 
purcJiased cooperative ginneries in business. This should not be 
permitted. ' . " -s.s ' .' 
••XV., 
. \ 
v. 
f 
•1 
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5. Hie future role of the GLSMB. 
5.1. Hie GLSMB has been a very high cost administrative and marketing 
structure for the services it has performed for the cotton industry. 
In 1968/9. CLSMB*s expenses were £56,?09, the crop being about 13.6 m 
Kg of seed cotton, or about 6.7 cts per Kg* In 1967/8 the cost was 
£ 58,460 for a crop of about 12.0 fa Kg, or over 9i7 cts per Kg. These 
21* 
costs are far too high* * Its future role must be determined on what 
services it can undertake and what level of costs will be incurred* It 
has been suggested that the CLSMB could be remodelled along the lines 
of the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) but this is more a wish 
to see the CLSMB become a relatively low cost organisation for the 
services provided than suggesting that the adoption of KTDA type roles 
by the CLSM3 would be in the interests of the cotton industry. The 
KTDA deals with a perennial, high value Crop, concentrated into a I ' relatively small area. The CLSMB is dealing with a dispersed, annual 
crop yielding under current levels of husbandry, a low income per 
1 
grower. I The KTDA approach was based on the already existing estate 
sector, non-existent with eottcri. Additionally, green tea q^st be 
f 
transported rapidly from the field to the factory and supervision and 
control of this stage of production by the central organisation is 
essential. This is not so with cotton. Clearly there are sufficient 
differences between the characteristics c£ these two crqs to ensure that 
the organisations concerned with them differ also. 
5*2. jtfhat sort of organisation is suitable for this currently £lm 
industry? (The tea industry generates a gross farm revenue of over £14m 
with the KTDA handling about ...:25V ~ of the total). The main require -
ment is that it should- be. low cost and, in the short run anyway, its 
role should be suitably low-poflie. . The promotion and development of 
eotton growing is better left with the Ministry of Agriculture which 
/ I 
now has taken over most of the costs of these services. There may be 
some overall interest taken in seed cotton collection but where the 
collection is undertaken by co-operative societies and Unions the 
.-••,. - -itm m i [ .,— ;. .. j.,. j . m. i 11 • • . ,,. . ; 
22, In 1960/61 the Uganda Lint Marketing Board incurred administrative costs 
of £116,826 for a crop of 371,318 bales of lint. (See the 1962 Ugandan 
Commission of Inquiry op. cit.) With an average lint nut-turn ratio 
of 327c this implies a crop of about 214.7m Kg of seed cotton and hence an 
average cost;of 1.1 cent per Kg. These costs are dated by 7 to 8 years 
.'-in comparison with the CLSMB figures quoted. 
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Dept. of co-operative Development is the proper organisation for 
their supervision, and otherwise the ginneries themselves should 
ensure that this task is performed as efficiently as possible. With 
the revised pricing structur^ it will be in their interests to do 
so. However, the CLSMB or its successor can perform its most useful 
roles in actively participating in ginning through the purchase and 
management of ginneries in conjunction with co-operatives, and in the 
marketing of lint and seedo t^n fact this last rie is its most important 
because additional ginning interests will be acquired probably only 
over a period of time and rightly so. Therefore it was recommended that 
the CLSMB or its successor should concentrate its activities on the 
ma;rketigof lint and seed in tha most favourable markets and forecasting 
23 
market prices for,these produces. Additionally where it is in the 
interests of growers or in the national interest to do so, the Board I 
should purchase and manage ginneries until such time that they may be 
taken over by the co-operative movement,, I ! 5.3. It is invisaged that these limited roles recommended above would 
require a much smaller administrative structure than is in existence 
i at the present time. This implies that the overhead administration costs 
could be very considerably reduced® The issue which remains is whether 
f 
the CLSMB itself lean undertake; this review of its future roles in the 
! 1 
cotton industry sfcd the necessary structure required to undertake these 
i 
roles or whether: the Ministry <jf Agriculture should undertake it. 
Whoever the aetyal agent may b<^  it was recommended that this review 
of the ClSMB's foles ad the resulting appropriate organisation is 
undertden with Borne urgency. \ 
5.4. Although its reserves havej been considerably depleted in recent 
years, the GL^MB presides still over a considerable stoek of money: 
over £400,000 by the end of 19^9 of which nearly £200,000 was in a 
relatively liquid form* During the 1968/9 year a gross trading surplus 
could be of nearly £147,600 was achieved and the surplus for 1969/70 / greater 
1 • •. 1 ' '';'»' '— • i 1 • 11 1 
25*. Since November 1970 - the CLSMB now ma int through cotton brokers 
in Uganda. From November 1966 until this tijme, the Board had an agreement 
with.Messrs Anderson playton and Hunt (Cotton Brtkers) Ltd to sell Kenya's 
lint bn a commission basis, more than £16,o6o in total in 1968/9. Prior to 
that a§ain the Kenyan crop was handled^also on a commission basis,by the 
Uganda tint Marketing Board. Therefore it can be said that only since late 
la&t ye^r has toe CLSMB played an active role in actually marketing the 
prop. Seed is sold by tender, usually in 100 ton lots. There are few buyers 
(in fact there are few seed crushing mills in K^nya) and therefore the 
.formation of prica rings or tendering-by-turn would be easy. Yet seed prices 
generally aboVe the estimated export parity price (jLittle or none is 
exported) §o-one presumes that the system ie working* " / 
\ V ,/ ;' I ! 
\ X // yy • i It 
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give. _he level of lint and,seed prices, 
still / The question which oust be asked are what are the purposes 
of these funds? Do they benefit the grower? It must not be forgotten 
that they represent returns withheld free growers. For a board 
like CLSMB funds can be designated for 3 purposes:-
a) to act as a tradag reserve in cases of inaccurate market 
forecasts; 
b) the acquisition of additional assets; 
c) working capital, 
5.5. It has been stated already that the role of the CLSMB in 
stabilising growers* prices should be minimised. The annual payout 
to producers, collectors and ginras,should reflect the market prices 
of the final products but, given that producer prices need to be 
advertised in advance, price forecasts will have to be made which 
will be subject to erDrs. Therefore a small trading reserve fund 
(as opposed to a price assistance fund) is considered necessary 
to allow for such contingencies. The required size of this reserve 
depends mainly on the accuracy of the CLSMB sales forecasts. It is 
to be hoped that a sum of not more than say 5% of turnover need be 
required, say £ 50,000. This is not an annual sum to be set aside 
but the ceiling which need not be exceeded-until growers' annual receipts 
are more than £lm, 
5.6. The acquisition of additional assets* The form of these are 
most likely to be ginneries purchased in conjuction with co-operatives. 
Now if the CLSMB sets aside the greater part of its remaining reserves 
for this purpose, the profits earned from these investments net of 
tax will accrue to the CLSMB and not to growers who receive only the 
profits earned from their share of the total investment through 
co-operatives* In fact there is no reason why a particular group of 
growers should be favoured by receiving the returns on the capital 
invested by the CLSMB even if, strictly speaking, these funds rightly 
belong to all cotton growers in Kenya, or at least the previous 
• 
generation of them. Clearly, though, given that investments of this 
nature by the CLSMB will be spread over a period of years and given 
that profits accruing from earlier investments may be accumulated for 
the purchase of additional assets later, the requirement for a very 
large investment fund for purchasing ginneries is not foreseen. 
5.7. Wortang capital. One of the reles of the CLSMB is to act as a 
marketing'agent of cotton lint and seed. It should act a£ a 
willing buyer of these products at declared prices which should be 
paid within at least a month of ginning. Although the ^actual ginning 
period of a single ginnery is relatively short, 6 months or so, because 
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cotton is grown widely across Kenya the period of time during which 
the CLSMB is purchasing lint is rather longer. The important considera-
tion from the CLSMB's point of view is the lag between paying for lint 
and seed and selling them* With much of the lint going to overseas 
buyers, this lag may be fairly long although it should be offset by 
sales of seed and lint made locally. It does seem an unnecessary 
condition that the CLSMB should be made to provide all of its own 
working capital from its own reserves which would have to be kept 
in a liquid form for the this purpose. A wider use of the Sugar and 
Cereal Finance Corporation is recommended together with closer 
financial links with other boards in order to pool their working 
capital requirements. One of the implications of the foregoing 
discussion is that the CLSMB should not be responsible for financing 
the purchase of the seed cotton from growers. It may be of benefit 
to the industry to decentralise this activity and make this the 
responsibility of the individual ginners. Possibly ginners may opt 
either to receive a higher margin and provide their own working 
capital or to receive a lower margin, the CLSMB providing the 
necessary finance. Of course, the CLSMB as a ginnery operator 
should use its capital reserves in :such a way to reduce its total 
interest payments. One advantage of such decentralisation is that 
ccEmercial banks would be encouraged to play a more active role in 
providing finance for this particular sector of the agricultural 
industry in Kenya. 
Investment and loaning policies of the CLSMB. It is considered 
that these deserve some criticism, the first for being unduly 
conservative and the second for being too generous. Investments in 
the cotton Price Assistance Fund are entirely in fixed interest 
stocko During the year 1968/69 (31st October) the return earned 
net of losses on redemption on an investment of nearly £276,000 was 
£12,231, or just under This is not a very good performance. 
It may be wondered whether the CLSMB has the necessary expertise to 
maximise its investment returns and whether, in fact, it should 
possess such large investible funds. On the other hand the CLSMB 
has outstanding nearly £111,600 in the form of loans and accrued infcCEst 
to growers and growers5 co-operatives of which nearly £107,700 is 
written down as--'bad debts8. Alternatively, in the 1968/9 Annual 
Reports-mention was made of "..expenses on cotton loans, amounting 
to £ 18,768 . « ,•«" The role, of statutory boards sach as.the CLSMB 
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as sources-cdLjcredii^ Jfor-ccitJion^  
5«9. Cotton seed for planting. The CLSMB has adopted a variety of pricing 
policies on cotton seed for planting. Up to 1S69 seed was issued free to 
growers. In that year about 6^,0® hectares were planted and at a planting 
rate of 20 Kg per hectare, tljis implies that at least 1,300 metric tons of 
AR seed were issued. The opportunity cost of this seed (i.e. the sale 
If 
price foregone) was about £25 per metric ton and therefore this policy cost 
the Board at least £32,500 Excluding handling, transport and bagging costs. 
In fact the cost was much higher than this because cotton growers had no 
incentive to economise on the use of seed and there was considerable wastage. 
In 1970 the policy was modified so that in scroe areas growers were charged 
shs 5/• per 9 Kg bag <jf dreesedseed_ {sufficient to plant 1 acre) but in 
other areas seed was still provided free but growers* returns were reduced 
there by 5 cents per Kg of seed cotton produced. Thus if the grower receiving 
free seed obtained a yield of less than 100 Kg of seed cotton pei^  acre he 
benefitted under this policy. This wa3 not efficient and was administratively 
troublesome. It was recommended that all growers should be charged thi 
true Cost of seed for planjjLng--al^hongh^of~ course, efforts should be joade to 
kedp this cost as low as possible, and it seems that the CLSMB was going to 
adopt this policy anyway. When ginneries were bagging seed for planting in 
1 cwt bags (at the time when all seed was issued free), their allowance was 
shstj 35*50 per ton, including shs. 20/- for dressing the seed, metric i 
tei^ ms this is equivalent to about 32 cents per 9 Kg bag but of course the 
smaller and currently plastic bag will incur higher costs, probably not less 
than 50 cents per bag. The opportunity cost of the seed is about 50-55 cents 
per Kg so that the true cost per 9 Kg bag of seed ex-ginnery could be anything ; i i up to shs. 5.50, Therefore the current price to the grower q£ shs. 5/- per 
b^g is too low because the retail margin of at least 10% should be added to the 
! • 
eje-gin price for co-bperative societies and other retail outlet^, plus a 
transport charge which could approach 1 cent per bag mile*- Excluding this 
isost of transport thf retail price should be at least shs. 6/- per bag. 
Jn fact it was reconsiended that the CLSMB should adopt a policy similar to I I 
that used by the Kenya Seed Company in distributing hybrid maize seed which 
is to have the same retail price throughout large contiguous areas rather 
than varying it by a transport differential. In this case the retail price 
for cotton seed for planting would be about shs. 7/- per 9 Kg bag, Shs, 2/-
more than it is now. The writer considers though that/if cotton growers 
are receiving a substantially higher^price-for their product, the subsidisation 
of coLcut r~5cet^ '7ir~h"o 'longer necessary nor desirable. The same applies to 
other inputs such as cotton spray providing- that the - grcrwex bas.access_ to some 
V form of seasonal credit. 
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6. Conclusion® 
6.1. The underlying thesis of this paper is that the growers of cotton 
will have to receive a substantially higher price for the crop than they 
are currently receiving if the industry is to develop at a satisfactory 
rate. Gathering together the foregoing recommendations, a guess may be 
made on what could be the 8target8 producer price for seed cotton given 
current levels of prices for lint and seed and expected costs. Reverting 
to equation (1.11) presented in the introductory section; 
K = pi a + ° (C. . + C + C J 
g 1 s c,t g m,a 
All the price and cost variables being in terms <£ shs. per Kg of seed 
cotton, lint or seed as appropriate. The folbwing tentative values 
for these variables are given for AR grade cotton:® 
P^ = shs. 4.40 (after subtracting transport costs) 
a = 9.32 P = shs, 0c43 s b = 0.66 
C ~ shs. 0.04 c,t 
C = shs. 0.25 8 
C = shs, 0.07 (based on 1968/9 costs) m,a 
Substituting these into the equation, we find 
Rp(AR) = 4.40(0,32) + 0.48(0.66) - (0o04+0.25+0,07) 
= 1.41 + 0.32 - 0.36 
= 1.37 
Therefore even after using these rather conservative values (receipts 
on the low side with costs on the high side), a target growers price 
for AR seed cotton of shs. 1.37 per Kg (about 62 cents per lb) is 
justified compared with shs. 1*10 per Kg now, a price increase of nearly 
25%. Individual growers would receive a greater or lesser return than 
this depending on their location within the country and in relation to the 
ginnery.- and ginneries may pay above the floor price. For 3R seed cotton 
the following values are a guide line. 
P^ bs shs. 2.64 
a = 0.29 
Ps = shs. 0a25 
b = 0.66 
with the costs being as for AR seed (ignoring here the 0,05 cents/Kg difference 
in ginning costs). 
^BCBR) 2" 6 4<°» 2 9> + 0.25(0.66) - 0.36) 
= 0.57 
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Thus for BR seed cotton the 'target growers price would be 57 cents 
per Kg, say 26 cents per lb. 
6.2. Alternatively, using equation 1.1 we can calculate what sort of 
product prices would be necessary to support the 'normal1 or 'target* 
costs, margins and returns put forward: 
C , collection costs: shs. 0.04/Kg seed cotton c 
C^, ginners margine; shs, 0e25/Kg seed cotton 
R^, growers returns: shs. 1.32/Kg seed cotton 
C , marketing and admin, costs: 0,07/Kg seed cotton m,a 
Thus 
P, + P.fc = C + C„ + R + C e g g m,a 
a 
Substituting values, 
P, + P 0.66 = 0.04 + 0.25 + 1.32 + 0.07 1 s 
0.32 
= 5.25 
If we set Pg at shs. 0.48 per Kg, then 
P^ « : = 5.35 - 0.99 
= 4.26 
Or the ex-gin price of lint (i.e. net of transport costs etc) would 
need to be shs„ 4,26/Kg or shs. 1*93 per lb to be able to hold these 
margins or returns. During the past 10 years, this 'target' price 
was not maintained during the period 1965-1967 (See Table 1,1 pege 
6). On the other hand further economics may be made on the cost side 
even in the short run: possibly a cent on collection costs, certainly 
5 cents on ginning plus, say, 2 on overhead marketing or administration 
costs0 This is a total of 8 cents per Kg of seed cotton or 25 cents 
per Kg in terms of the "fail safe* lint price. With these economies, 
this now becomes shs. 4.01 per Kg. Such a low average lint price has not yet 
be«rr .; reached, at least not during the past decade. 
\ 
\ 
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Appendix, 
Referring to para0 2,4 footnote 7, in practice if-wns " ~ c~ V 
recommended that ginners* returns for seed cotton should be on an »into~ginnery' 
! , • basis rather than pn an 'at collection point® basis, the implication of 
paragraph 2,4, "fhe into-ginnery price would be gazetted for each ginnery zone, 
Hiis means that the collecting agents whether co-operatives or ginnery agents, would 
have to deduct their costs including transport from the seed cotton price paid 
to growers. This.was seen to be an acceptable policy where collection is undar-taken 
by cooperatives on behalf of growers but less so where collection is undertaken 
by agents employed by ginners, for example at Kitui and at the Coast, In these 
cases there is the danger that growers might be exploited and the writer reconmended 
that the CLSMB should oversee growers' prices in these cases. Additionally, of 
course, co-operatives may choose to oper; te a transport pool system within a 
ginnery zone to gain political appeal and for administrative ease, thus negating 
the attempts td disentangle the intensive from the extensive 
production forjwhich the policy of para 2»4 .was-formulated,, 
Y 
